Against Ur-Fascism
Identifying fascism by its theory of power
The study of fascism has a problem of basic definition. It is widely agreed that fascism has certain common tendencies but the reason for this is usually not stated. An example is the essay "Ur-Fascism" by Umberto Eco. He attempts to describe a proto-fascist situation by its symptoms rather than making a root diagnosis. In many cases, a symptoms-first approach can be productive. Still, it is this approach which can blind people who are trying to discover exactly what fascism is. The mistake is the belief that fascism has no core and no driving idea, that it is primarily a collection of symptoms, a syndrome rather than a full disease. But fascism is a disease and it must be fully pathologized.
First, it's necessary to dispense with the notion of fascism-as-syndrome, and my approach is straight-forward: no collection of "fascist" symptoms can be said to be representative of fascism alone. Eco does address this issue, it must be noted, but mentioning a problem does not solve it. For the proposed facets in "Ur-Fascism" to be useful they must provide a way for us to see fascism as distinct from other political ideologies. "Ur-Fascism" does not achieve this. I'll demonstrate with a few examples.
The cult of tradition exists in most liberal(izing) societies, including the United States, India, Brazil, et. al., in heritage holidays, national dress, and so on; if viewing "rural exile" policies as fitting into this category (i.e. sending city-dwellers, especially intellectuals, to rural places so they could learn from simplicity and poverty), socialist-communist countries also engaged heavily in promoting traditional values and ways of being.
The appeal to the frustrated middle class was the explicit draw in the American and French Revolutions, and can be said of the Russian Revolutions as well (considering that urban workers were seen as more socioeconomically developed than rural peasants).
Concerning the use of "Newspeak" and manipulation of language in general, it is well known that the revolutionaries of France attempted to change human relations through changing the calendar, changing the marking of time; the creation of new coupled with the suppression of old.
The concept that life is permanent warfare is in no way unique to fascists. It is one of the key maxims of realpolitik, one of the dominant ways of viewing international politics. It is also the central idea of market economies: that everyone is working to their own advantage first.
The idea that fascists see their enemies as simultaneously strong and weak often grabs the imagination, it makes us feel like we've finally got the core of it: they are inconsistent here, duplicitous, and that is the mark of fascism. When you think about it closely, however, you must see that this is not unique at all, it's the kind of reaction one might have when challenged at school recess: puffing out your chest to your friends but whining about unfairness in private. Many groups do this, especially when they are in a revolutionary posture as it signals both danger and the possibility of overcoming that danger. Communists and anarchists can similarly be accused of painting their enemies as strong ("we must work in secret, we must endure their oppression") and weak ("they can be defeated, they will not stand against the people").
My point here is not that Eco's observations are inaccurate but that they don't provide any special insight. Knowing these observations does not make it easier to differentiate a fascist movement from a non-fascist one. This is why it is significant that Eco claims there is no real center of gravity for the traits which Eco labels ur-fascist. That center would allow us to make certain concrete observations of what fascism truly is, not just how it affects others. Being able to make such an observation would be a starting point from which we could begin to address fascism as a specific issue.
Eco isn't alone in this failure of observation. Robert Paxton's definition is also entirely symptomatic, as is that of Stanley G. Payne. Everywhere there is almost a reluctance to dig too deep into what fascism is. I see two major reasons for this reluctance, as evidenced by the way these definitions are expressed. The first reason is the desire not to offend conservatives. This is evidenced in the frequency that fascists are described as anti-conservative despite the consistency of fascist-conservative alliance throughout fascism's history. The second reason is the desire not to offend the idea of loving one's own country. This can be seen in the separation of nationalism from ultranationalism, or in the similar separation of patriotism from nationalism. Since the issue of nationalism is more open, I will start there. That is to say: nationalism does have its different aspects but denying that fascism is tightly connected to conservativism is simple refusal of reality.
Nationalism and Duality
Why do I leave room for nationalism? Because when we talk about nationalism we may actually be talking about (at least) two different things. As constructed by ancient peoples and by documents like the Bible, a "nation" is a kind of much-extended family, a kind of large or old or significant clan. As used in the modern day, a "nation" is most commonly understood as the sovereign community of all people in a geographic region. This overlap resulted, in my opinion, from the utility of the national concept (first sense of nation) for creating a more unified community in situations (such as colonial rule) where the community's strength had formerly been divided along lines like tribe, religion, economy, and so on; for this reason, a regional community adopts an inclusive nationalism (second sense of nation).
Expressions of nationalism therefore fall into one of two categories. The first is mythic nationalism, built mainly from the nation-clan conception. The second is practical nationalism, drawing from the nation-region conception. Much like the confusion of types of nation, there is also a confusion in these nationalisms; one reason that I couldn't call the second expression "liberatory nationalism" is that it often functions alongside the more exclusionary clan/mythic nationalism. That said, the distinction will help us in identifying fascism because we will not find fascism outside of a movement showing a high degree of mythic nationalist sentiment. Before proceeding, however, I want to be clear: a regime can still be abhorrent and repressive without mythic nationalism, but such a regime should not be considered fascist in this specific sense I'm trying to lay out.
Mythic nationalism is the aspect of fascism that is most readily identified by others. I believe that its relation to practical region-based (or situation-based) nationalism is why people are reticent to highlight it as the single core of fascist thought. Eco, for instance, in the many aspects he suggests, never accounts for the violence which is inherent to fascism. He talks about the cult of tradition, the rejection of difference, and the cult of action, but does not consider that there is a single knowable source of these. This source is not mythic nationalism; I will elaborate this later. For now, I want to flesh out what mythic nationalism is, given that I have not seen a description that fully matches this idea.
It is important to see that the myth is the central feature of mythic nationalism. Where practical nationalism is based on shared circumstance, mythic nationalism is based on shared belief in a single myth. Someone who is born in Germany is a German in a practical sense; everyone "eligible" to be German is German. As regards the nazi myth, however, eligibility was not enough for someone to be a member; nazis needed to espouse their belief in some way. A German deemed eligible for the nazi-formulated identity could reject that identification (this rejection being most clear in those who actively resisted the regime). This myth is not a concrete narrative but a set of beliefs which are trusted, without evidence, to bring believers into ascendancy as their imagined nation.
Despite differences in detail, the outline of this national myth is very similar across mythic nationalist movements. First, the myth concocts a national identity out of elements it has to hand (an American nationalist movement would not arise in Turkmenistan, for example, because there are few Americans living there) and claims that this nation is owed greatness. Next, the myth states that a nation is strongest when it is homogenous; all people within a nation-state's borders must be part of the nation or at least under such a person's rule. It then draws the social boundaries of the "true nation" more narrowly than a practical nationalism would. Due to these three mythic beliefs, a mythic nationalist movement will pursue eliminationism at home (to "purify" itself and increase its potency) and aggression abroad (to seize things it needs).
All this may give the impression that mythic nationalism is at the root of fascism but I again have to disagree. Mythic nationalism is a tool used by fascism but it is not the center; rather, the center is what predisposes fascism to use this tool. The root of fascism, the central fascist idea, is this: power is an object which must be seized and the one who holds power is entitled to use it as they see fit.
The Theory of Power as An Object
To repeat: the central fascist theory holds that power is an object which must be seized and the one who holds power is entitled to use it as they see fit.
This theory of power is the core belief from which the rest of fascism springs. Other groups do believe in similar ideas. Monarchists and militarist despots both embrace autocracy, and movements across the political spectrum have advocated the extralegal seizure of state power. For fascists, however, autocracy is not only the means, it is also the ideological end. It doesn't justify itself by anything but its own desire and respect for power. This fascist system doesn't just mean that some people must rule others; there is to be a ladder of rulers and rulers of rulers until one reaches the supreme ruler. It provides position and status, regularizing a state of affairs that would be obviously unjust were it explained in any other way. By believing in nothing but the reality of power, fascists allow themselves unrestrained use of power once they have achieved it.
Before I go further to talk about specific tenets, I want to make myself clear about mechanistic descriptions and reification of race, religion, sex, and other cultural concepts. I will describe certain ideas or moves as serving a function in society, like saying that the purpose of racism is to divide the lower class against itself, not to insult or oppress any particular race. This is not to ignore the fact that racism is much more deeply held than adherence to speed limit signs or the fact that sexist violence cross class lines or anything of that nature. By talking about mechanistic function of purpose, I am trying to put these concepts into context, highlighting the reasons that fascism and exclusionisms implement one another.
Returning to the fascist theory of power, I believe we can see that it is the core fascist idea because it is what motivates fascism but not what motivates other autocratic ideologies. As I've said, mythic nationalism is subscribed to by different kinds of groups, but fascism is the only one to mobilize this belief as part of its program. A supporter of monarchy does not need to be racist but a supporter of fascism is invariably racist, ethnocentric, or at the very least exclusionary based on such cultural traits. Fascism mobilizes itself explicitly through racists, through bigots, and it champions bigotry as a right granted to this nation they imagine.
America has a very prominent national myth and this myth existed even from the days of the American Revolution. The nature of this myth evolved alongside American society to the point that it now exists, in a mainstream sense, in a form which is not driven by the pursuit of racist goals. A conservative American myth can even explicitly involve the idea that the nation is a space where all kinds of people, from many backgrounds and with differing allegiances, can excel and add to the national good. Being a non-ideology, however, conservativism is not so committed to racism that it cannot be formulated without it; for many, the American national myth accepts all races but does not accept communists. Instead, conservativism is arrived at by those with a certain amount of capital, and it is at least as ready to ally with other holders of capital (regardless of race or other markers) as it is to do anything else.
By contrast, a fascist national myth always focuses on race because, by simply invoking it, a difference can be emphasized within a society which leaves a vulnerable minority on the other side. When I say "by simply invoking it", what I mean is that very often a specific concept of race (i.e. if people in a country divide themselves into different races/tribes/nations/etc.) can constructed without precedent, even in a heretofore homogenous (or liberally-mixed) society, in order to legitimize bigotry and repression. The tension between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi can arguably be blamed on this controversial claim of difference which may not have been important in earlier times. Exploiting this purported difference allows fascists to loot the minority and to build their presence in society through public displays of impunity. By using race in this way, the fascists openly declare their targets and simultaneously declare who are not their targets. Fascists use this to lessen the amount of push-back they will get from the larger section of society, allowing them to execute their thefts and their grand-standing violence.
The Autocratic Impulse
Another lens through which it's useful to see fascism is the development of autocracy. The justification of the rule of the many by the few is a major preoccupation of any autocratic regime; without this, the subjects of a regime may refuse to be ruled, causing all the fissures that eventually bring regimes down. Regimes justify themselves by three methods – pragmatism, charismatism, and dogmatism – so we can lay out three main patterns of autocracy: despotism, monarchism (or royalism), and fascism.
When we use the term despotism we have to raise and then release the notion of "Oriental despotism" – this has no bearing on what I'm discussing. Despotism as an idea can be applied to feudal structures, clientelism, military juntas, warlords, and so on. In the broadest sense, what primarily binds all systems of governing is the sharing of rewards and burdens. In despotism, this is especially explicit. All rulers, even the most absolute autocrats, are ultimately not more than the presiding member of the constituent class. Despots are engaged in a purely pragmatic allegiance with the rest of their class, personally distributing wages and rewards. As an ideology, despotism means rule by those who can, chosen based on the resources they have and will be able to get.
There are two typical sorts of despots in the modern day: militarist despots and neo-colonial despots. Neither is less violent than the other, despite that split. Instead, the difference is that militarists rely on their own military while neo-colonialists rely on foreign assistance (typically from Europe or the United States). Again, these are ideal types which may mix when witnessed. Regardless, the position of a despot is never threatened by behavior or thought (except insofar as that behavior and thought affects the flow of rewards from despot to constituents).
Despotism is what I call a non-ideology: it is a state of affairs which tends to bring about certain thoughts and behaviors (being like an ideology in this way) but without having philosophical or moral tenets (*In brief, for me to consider something as a political ideology, it has to have an analysis which explains why things are and/or why they should be a certain way.). Despotism maintains its position by wealth, force, or a mixture of the two. All parties may have their own (and even opposing) ideologies but what binds them together is not shared thought but the purely practical matter of maintaining their place atop society.
Monarchism is not strictly an ideology, either (*Monarchism fails the test for being an appeal to authority rather than an analysis and theory.) – which is why it doesn't make much sense in a liberalized world – but it is based on a shared idea. While the position of a despot is secured by effectiveness, the monarch's position is secured by privileges. The unifying idea of monarchism/royalism is that certain people are inherently more fit to rule than others. This isn't necessarily hereditary – Napoleon must be thought of as a monarchist but he became a royal through the politics of the French Revolution rather than inheriting that prestige – but it must be impossible to transfer through predictable and perceptible means. In the instance of direct heredity, for example, there is an assumption that something in the blood or the genes passes desirable and knowable traits of good rulership from rulers to their children, but this assumption has (and likely will) never be proven; the fact that it is unproven is actually central to why it is the mark of leadership.
The link between a monarch and those they rule over is always intangible because that is what charisma is: the intangible attraction or force of influence. It's what differentiates this sort of control than that of a despot who rules based on overt violence or bribery. It isn't heredity which legitimizes monarchism, it is monarchism which legitimizes hereditary succession. Because the quality that gives someone the charisma of the monarch is impossible to verify, the alliance made by the constituents continues on its own inertia so long as that heir can occupy the same linking position. It's only by the idea of innate but invisible qualities that an autocratic regime is able to move between sovereigns without shattering. In history, monarchism was often outwardly identified with divinity, a similarly intangible field, and monarchism brought that tendency on in order to justify itself during royal minorities and other complicated situations.
The arch-political problem with regime change, even from parent to child, is that it can make a drastic shift in a country's politics. Until the 18th century, most political organizing was not around ideas but around people; those people may have promoted certain ideas, but supporters knew they supported first a person and not a promise. In fact, these ideas were often simply personal causes, such as which group of nobles got the best appointments though none were interested in actually changing their new domains. Any maneuvering of this was likely to splinter the constituent class, possibly impoverishing some while creating new (and possibly unpredictable) constituents to take the place of the losers. Avoiding the problems of regime change, and thereby not tampering with the order of the constituent class, is enough for many to put up with inexperienced but uncontroversial sovereigns.
The logic of monarch and hereditary rule therefore derives from the situation at hand and the desires of those holding power. Inheritance happens in despotates as well as monarchies but, in the case of despots, this inheritance can be coincidental in that anyone can legitimately disrupt this transfer of power should they have the political power to do so. In monarchies, inheritance as a concept (hereditary and non-hereditary) is enshrined and protected as a first principle, thereby reinforcing the ruler's right to pass rule down in a similar way. We can see this in the way that monarchist usurpers (*those who seek to replace the monarch rather than abolishing that role) tend to try and legitimize themselves according to existing customs, using methods like marrying into an established ruling (or formerly ruling) family, performing certain public rites, changing religious affiliation, and so on. This can be contrasted with the sordid mire of betrayal and violence that was the imperial college of Rome: still an autocratic government, but not an ideologically monarchist one.
The Development of Ideology
In the essential sense, fascism is as old as humankind. It must be true that among the many chiefs, monarchs, and usurpers which populated the world before the Protestant Reformation, there were those who believed truly in the maxim of might makes right. This is the distillation of the fascists' central theory that I spoke about earlier (*at that time, I stated the theory in a way that made it clearer that the theory is a philosophical principle for fascists, not simply a description of a government's situation). Can we necessarily prise fascist ideas out of ancient philosophy, history, or myth? We can draw parallels between medieval European stories about knights and modern western stories about police – both serve to romanticize those involved in the brutal oppression of state subjects – but it is a step too far to say that both are expressions of exactly the same idea. However, the fact that the concept of power being its own legitimizer is so universal suggests that at least some people and rulers had philosophies that would be highly similar to modern fascism.
I draw that point out in order to emphasize the idea that these different systems (despotism, monarchism, and fascism) should not be seen as development out of one another: just as despots existed even when monarchs were common (and beyond), fascist ideas are likely much older than we usually conceive of. What makes modern fascism notable is not its ideas but its formulation. Before the late 1700s it was never necessary to be an explicit fascist because such impulses were being satisfied through monarchy and despotism.
What made the formulation of fascism necessary was the rise of (practical) nationalism and liberalism. Though monarchies continue to exist even now, long past the establishment of liberalism, they were rapidly put under the control of the government of the people; when done overtly, this is constitutional monarchy. Creating centralized power that was not based on the expressed assent of the people became impossible under the old systems of autocracy, both being regarded now as fundamentally illegitimate.
Fascism solves these issues. It affirms the idea that the government must serve the nation but it controls the definition of the nation and, in any case, it simply assumes national assent rather than asking. Fascism gives the autocrat the inherent right to rule because it designates the leader as the embodiment of the national strength and will. It eliminates dissent by making all people adhere to a standardized idea of their national values and by this it also reinforces belief in the leader's intrinsic right to rule. Because liberalism had destroyed the idea that common people could not rule themselves, autocracy had to be rationalized in such a way that it would make sense to adhere to autocracy for someone who is, in a manner of speaking, disenchanted.
Trimming the Root
From what I have laid out so far, I believe it should be clear that fascism is a philosophy of absolute autocracy, but I have not clearly shown why the theory of power must be the central belief of fascism. The best evidence of this is the fascist alliance with conservative and fascists' consistent right-wing politics. As laid out, fascism isn't necessarily racist or hetero-sexist (mythic nationalism de-emphasizes co-existence but doesn't strictly forbid it) and there is also a clear tendency towards anti-religiousness, though this is usually abandoned. All of these phenomena, including their shifting position on religion, can be explained by the primacy of their lust for the seizure and use of state power.
The functional reason for racism and other anti-minority sentiment is the exploitation of the minority group; that is to say, this is what makes it of interest as a policy position. By using the existing prejudices of the society, a fascist group can develop and demonstrate its power without disrupting the underpinnings of their society as it currently is. This process is also in evidence among conservatives who attempt to reinforce their power against liberalizing and socialist forces. The character Varys created by George R.R. Martin said "Power resides where men believe it resides"; this is the basic principle at work. By exercising their power publicly, fascists and/or conservatives inspire belief in their power. By attacking the already-disadvantaged, they pick a target which is relatively safe, neither being able to put up much resistance nor being granted any solidarity from their neighbors.
From this we can see the primary draw of fascists and conservatives to prejudice-as-platform is due to its efficiency in developing political power, especially understood as unilateral power; broad-based movements can also quickly grow formidable but they are less able to be manipulated by concentrated interests. Clearly there is a compatibility here. The difference between conservatives and fascists is that fascists couch their ideas in a belief and conservatives do not. This is not to say that conservatives don't have beliefs. As a political bloc, however, conservatives are not united by dogma (or ideology) but by their specific situations. Conservativism has been present in all regimes and societies and it will probably remain with people for all time. To be called a conservative, one needs only to resist change in the current social structure. Conservativism is not an ideology in the same way that fascism is because conservativism doesn't come out of analysis: it is simply a reaction by those who hoard property & wealth against those would put that capital under the public supervision. Those who are doing well in a system are not predisposed to change things because any political change adds risk to their ability to hold onto their assets.
Obviously, the wealthy are reflexively conservative (having leeched their fortunes from their subjects, they aren't in a hurry to give them back) but protection from expropriation is not the only draw toward conservativism. Some conservatives are primarily mythic nationalists and others are simply xenophobes or anti-otherists. There are other tendencies as well, among them the peculiar aspect of subjection effect which causes some subjects to believe that they deserve their circumstances and that they are properly placed in a correct and natural order.
In the case of religion, we see the true desire driven by the theory and the compromise which is also driven by the theory. Fascists would always wish to eliminate all religion but that which is strictly controlled by the fascist faction, and even then they may still prefer a kind of atheism. Any other metaphysical appeal could provide a rival for fascist influence. However, established religions are often very difficult to unseat and they can create widespread problems until then. Therefore, though fascists would prefer a totalitarian social framework, it is often much more efficient to make deals with and attempt to co-opt major religious organizations. We might be able to see a bit of this in Mussolini's appeals to Islam when he invaded Libya, hoping to be accepted by the cultural power brokers who already lived in the area.
Like fascists, conservatives are often wrongly believed to be preoccupied with history. For conservatives, history explains how things came to be as they are now; history is useful to the extent that it justifies the current order. For fascists, history provides a space in which their great national myth can be created and readily accepted. A national construction with known (factual or legendary) links between the region's history and the people who currently live there will be more convincing to those people. For example, British fascists did not venerate figures like Julius Caesar who were at the center of the "original" fascist movement of Italy, they instead used King Arthur and other British heroes as their icons.
I draw two observations from that point. First, this is another mechanistic reason for the consistency of fascist racism. Because fascists often look into regional history to build their myth upon, this myth will not be nearly as appealing to people who have immigrated to the region recently. In fact, glorification of certain historical events and people may be distasteful to those people who don't identify with those occurrences. Because of this – unless an immigrant community is sufficiently large and well-organized (i.e. separately from the state) – fascists are likely to weaponize the distaste they inspire by barring selected others from their movement and attacking those groups by every means: economically, socially, physically, mentally, and so on.
The second observation is that there is nothing in what I've said which means that fascists couldn't have a future-based national myth. In fact, most of the 20th century fascist movements explicitly talked about bringing a new greatness to their countries, and the fascist adoration of technology is very well-known at this point. At an extreme, the Futurist movement in Italy (which became strongly linked to fascism) completely detested the past. Both the German and Italian fascists, though appealing to the past, largely promised and worked towards a future greatness which would be equal to or greater than what came before. It is sometimes considered unusual that fascists are obsessed by both modernity and tradition. This is the point upon which they turn.
Fascists and Conservatives
What did not figure into that elaboration was the reason that conservatives and fascists ally; this is because it doesn't relate to their shared interest in history. Instead, their alliance is possible due to their differing ideas about power, their differing purposes for engaging with it. Fascism is based on the theory that power must be seized and exploited. Conservatives (here meaning the highly-monied and/or -influential arch-conservatives), as a collective, respond to the relationships of a state. Every regime is based around a small number of constituents; this isn't the common understanding of the word, I am using "constituent" to describe something closer to what we might call an "oligarch", though aside from business people the constituent group historically includes military chiefs and some other people with authority. The role of the constituents is to support the government and to benefit from the state. It's the sovereign's job to be the government, managing the day-to-day affairs of the state (and usually being awarded or honored for this service), allowing constituents the freedom to enjoy their wealth and position without obligation.
There is more to be said about this construction but that must wait for another time. For now, what is important to see is that the arch-conservatives are engaging in politics for the purpose of remaining in their place as constituents. They do not strictly reject any regime before another except insofar as a regime causes them annoyance, insult, or hardship. Fascists, on the other hand, are predominantly interested in taking supreme political power. Because of this coincidence, conservatives are often willing to allow fascists to attain that power as long as the fascists agree not to appropriate from allied conservatives. If conservatives agree to suffer themselves to be ruled and to refrain from sabotaging the new order, fascists are happy not to waste time and effort seizing conservative-owned factories and then trying to run them with quarter-trained and half-dead workers. Also, because the wealthiest people in a region are usually from families who have been long established there, they are much less likely to be othered by fascist movements who draw upon that region's history. Thus, those wealthy people are more likely to show willing or even enthusiastic support for fascists.
If fascists had been able to continue their regimes for more than one generation, it is very likely that we would have more readily observed fascism as simply a reinvention of monarchy. Particular fascist regimes would have fallen along a spectrum with the Princes of Italian Rome at this end and the Emperors of Byzantine Rome at that. Fascists had already been experimenting with sacralism, which I am not locating in supposed occult beliefs but in things like the Blutfahne and Mussolini's attempts to associate fascism with Christianity. Like the old kings of Celts, Gauls, Goths, and Germans, fascist leaders claim authority first over a people, which is to say, a nation. Like those nations of old, the rule of one is only pursued by those who seek power for their own ends (which is to say, those older nations only rarely had such kings). To the extent that there exists such a thing as "ur-fascism", it should be defined as the desire to gain and use personal power: the desire for autocracy. This desire becomes fascism when it adopts the fascist dogma of power as an object.